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ABSTRACT
In the past several years in particular, intra-military sexual
assault and rape in the U.S. armed forces have been the focus of
frequent media attention and intense congressional debate. Despite
reforms, the rate of intra-military sexual crimes continues to remain
high, as does soldiers’ wariness to report instances of sexual violence
to military commanders. These problems and others have invigo-
rated the position taken by some that outside judicial review of in-
tra-military sexual crimes is necessary to provide justice to victims
and lower the rate of intra-military sexual assault and rape. This
Note argues that one of the primary contributors to intra-military
sexual assault and rape is the gendered nature of the military itself.
Given the nature of these acts, intra-military sexual assault and rape
can be properly qualified as “gender crimes.” This Note also points
out that this problem is not unique to the United States, as other
militaries around the world struggle with intra-military sexual vio-
lence. Due to this widespread occurrence and international human
rights laws prohibiting rape and gender-based violence more gener-
ally, this Note argues that intra-military sexual assault and rape
should be viewed as international gender crimes in violation of in-
ternational customary law. It is theorized that recognizing intra-
military sexual assault and rape in this manner can bring greater
attention to these crimes and help push for independent judicial re-
view of intra-military sexual crimes on the domestic level
worldwide.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the past two decades, rape and sexual assault1
within the U.S. armed forces have gained increasing recognition as serious
concerns warranting the attention of military officials, legislators, and the
American public. Some have even referred to the problem as the military’s
sexual assault “epidemic.”2 In the past 10 years, the military has taken steps
to tackle this problem through measures such as greater transparency in
reporting and by providing better training on sexual assault prevention to
officers and soldiers.3
Yet reports of pervasive military sexual violence continue. In 2013, a
total of 2,870 men and women filed reports of service member on service
member incidents of sexual assault or rape in the U.S. military.4 These re-
ports represent only approximately 10 percent of actual incidents of sexual
1. Unless explicitly stated, this Note uses the term “sexual assault” to refer to both the
acts of sexual assault and rape.
2. See, e.g., Amy Goodman & Denis Moynihan, Addressing the Epidemic of Military
Sexual Assault, DEMOCRACY NOW (May 9, 2013), http://www.democracynow.org/
blog/2013/5/9/addressing_the_epidemic_of_military_sexual_assault; Molly
O’Toole, Military Sexual Assault Epidemic Continues to Claim Victims as Defense De-
partment Fails Females, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 6, 2012), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2012/10/06/military-sexual-assault-defense-
department_n_1834196.html.
3. See DEP’T OF DEF., Mission & History, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE
OFFICE, http://www.sapr.mil/index.php/about/mission-and-history (last visited Mar.
26, 2015) [hereinafter SAPRO, Mission & History] (detailing initiative for greater
transparency regarding the military’s sexual assault policy and statistics taken in
2004).
4. See 2013 DEP’T OF DEF. ANN. REP. ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 1, 122,
125 [hereinafter DEP’T OF DEF.], available at http://sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/
FY13_DoD_SAPRO_Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assault.pdf (unrestricted and re-
stricted reports). In 2013, 2,310 unrestricted reports of service member on service
member sexual assault were filed. Id. at 122. There were 560 restricted reports of
service member on service member sexual assault that year. Id. at 125. All forms of
sexual assault that fit standard modern definitions of the term and rape are both
included in this Department of Defense report. Rape, however, is defined as “pene-
trative” sex in the report. Id. at 46. Sodomy was also included as one of the acts of
sexual misconduct reported in the survey and is included in the statistics addressed in
this Note. Id. Approximately 24 percent of overall sexual crimes, including crimes
perpetrated by unknown offenders or known offenders who were not in the military,
were qualified as “rape.” See id. at 74.
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violence that occur within the military.5 For the crimes that are reported,
the decision whether to pursue a sexual assault accusation has historically
been left largely to the discretion of a suspected perpetrator’s commanding
officer.6
If the available evidence substantiates a finding of sexual assault, a
commanding officer may bring a military suspect before a military tribunal;
impose a less severe “non-judicial” punishment, adverse administrative ac-
tion or administrative discharge.7 Congressional reforms to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) passed in 2014 and 2015 have imposed
more stringent disciplinary minimums and oversight requirements for dis-
position of military sexual assault cases.8 Still, many are concerned that re-
form within the military may not be enough without complete independent
review, bringing sexual assault cases outside of the military itself.9
5. Even though the Department of Defense 2013 report claims that the percentage of
crimes reported is on par with the civilian population, this appears unlikely accord-
ing to the numbers alone. Compare id. at 64 (“Civilian reporting behavior is mir-
rored in the U.S. Armed Forces. . . . [T]he Department estimates that fewer than 20
percent of military sexual assault victims report the matter to a military authority.”),
with id. at 71 (showing that, in the year 2012, survey results suggested that nearly
26,000 members of the U.S. military experienced unwanted sexual contact, while
only 2,828 service members actually reported such crimes, meaning that 10 percent
of victims reported their crimes). As “sexual contact” encompasses a broader category
of sexual misconduct than sexual assault, it is possible that reporting rates may differ
slightly for sexual assault in particular. Regardless, it is likely that the military exper-
iences a lower reporting rate for sexual incidents than the civilian population as there
are special factors at play in the military that deter victims from reporting. Cf.
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 15–16, 28–29
(2013), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/09242013_Statutory_Enforcement_Report_Sex
ual_Assault_in_the_Military.pdf (discussing “mixed messages” in military leadership
concerning rape, high concentration of males in supervisory positions, confidential-
ity concerns, fear of negative consequences, lack of confidence in military justice
system, and fear of retaliation as deterrents to reporting).
6. See COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 64–66.
7. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 4, at 78.
8. See Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2015, H.R. 3979, 113th Cong. §§ 531–38 (2014) (enacted); Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, H.R. 3304, 113th Cong.
§§ 1701–53 (2013) (enacted). These statutes are referred to in this Note as NDAA
FY 2015 and NDAA FY 2014, respectively. The 2013 Department of Defense statis-
tics and much of the scholarship on U.S. inter-military sexual assault were compiled
before these reforms passed. As such, it is not clear what effect these reforms will
have on intra-military sexual assault in the U.S.
9. See, e.g., Helen Cooper, Senate Rejects Blocking Military Commanders from Sexual
Assault Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/us/
politics/military-sexual-assault-legislation.html?_r=0 (echoing sentiment among
some members of Congress and advocacy groups that independent review of military
2015] S E X U A L  A S S A U L T  A N D  R A P E  I N  T H E  M I L I T A R Y 211
Efforts to bring intra-military sexual assault cases outside of the mili-
tary itself have largely failed. Constitutional separation of powers principles
articulated in the 1950 U.S. Supreme Court case Feres v. United States10
prevent intra-military sexual assault victims from bringing tort claims
against commanding officers for inadequate handling of their cases and sex-
ual assault in the military more generally.11 Meanwhile, congressional efforts
in 2013 to provide independent oversight for military sexual assault cases
failed to garner enough support in Congress to pass.12
Accordingly, intra-military sexual assault victims have begun to look
outside of the U.S. for relief. In March 2014, victims of military sexual
misconduct requested that the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights investigate the practices of the U.S. government regarding the han-
dling of sexual misconduct cases.13 As in the U.S., intra-military sexual as-
sault victims in several countries around the world have increasingly grown
frustrated with their respective governments’ inability to adequately address
sexual crimes committed by their own soldiers.14 Efforts taken by victims of
intra-military sexual assault in the U.S. and the U.K.,15 and struggles with
sexual assault cases is necessary); see also U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note
5, at 66–68 (discussing the flaws of the U.S. military’s disciplinary procedures).
10. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950).
11. See, e.g., Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 512 (4th Cir. 2013) (rejecting military
sexual misconduct victims’ tort claims against former secretaries of defense regarding
military sexual assault policy as these claims would involve judicial questioning of
military policy); Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369, 376–77 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also
Ann-Marie Woods, A More Searching Judicial Inquiry: The Justiciability of Intra-Mili-
tary Sexual Assault Claims, 5 B.C. L. REV. 1329 (2014) (discussing Feres’ effect on
military sexual assault victims’ ability to bring tort claims in civilian courts). For
further discussion, see infra Part III, Section B.
12. See Military Justice Improvement Act, S. 1752, 113th Cong. (2013). For a discus-
sion of the bill’s filibuster, see Cooper, supra note 9.
13. See Int’l Human Rights Clinic, Petition Before the Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., CORNELL
U. L. SCH. (Mar. 2014), http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/academics/clinical-
program/int-human-rights/upload/IACHR-US-Military-Submission-FINAL.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Emily L. Hauser, Opening Up About Sexual Assault in Israel, DAILY BEAST
(June 20, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/20/opening-up-
about-sexual-assault-in-israel.html; John Lichfield, France Battles Sexual Abuse in the
Military, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 20, 2014), www.independent.co.uk/news/world/eu-
rope/france-battles-sexual-abuse-in-the-military-9271383.html (pointing to internal
process in France); Sarah Rainey, ‘Military Rape is Like Being Abused by Your Family’,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (Feb. 7, 2014), www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/
10624398/Military-rape-is-like-being-abused-by-your-family.html (detailing intra-
military sexual assault problem in the U.K. and one victim’s plan to bring her case
before the European Court of Human Rights).
15. Rainey, supra note 14.
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the issue in several other militaries, exemplify intra-military assault’s impor-
tance as an international issue.16
This Note argues that intra-military sexual assault is a widespread gen-
der-based human rights issue of international importance. As such, this
Note suggests that customary international law may provide intra-military
sexual assault victims with protection from wrongdoings committed against
them. By strengthening the prohibition against intra-military sexual assault
through the use of international human rights bodies, intra-military sexual
assault victims may be able to effect policy changes on a domestic level in
their respective countries. Hopefully, this change will take the form of rec-
ognition equal to that received by civilian sexual assault victims, allowing
intra-military sexual assault victims to bring perpetrators before an indepen-
dent, civilian court.
Part I of this Note presents intra-military sexual assault as a serious
gender-based human rights issue in the United States and other countries
around the world. Part II provides background information on the current
international legal climate regarding military sexual crimes. Despite near-
universal recognition of sexual assault as a violation of international law, this
Part shows that the international legal system itself cannot adequately ad-
dress intra-military sexual crimes as it currently stands.
Part III describes the U.S.’s handling of intra-military sexual assault
and why U.S. military tribunals and domestic courts are currently inade-
quate at handling these offenses. Finally, Part IV presents intra-military sex-
ual assault as conduct prohibited by international customary law, thus
requiring greater government action. To advance intra-military sexual as-
sault’s status under customary international law, intra-military sexual assault
victims can bring claims before international human rights bodies. Al-
though international bodies are unable to effectuate significant changes on
their own, their recognition of the problem of intra-military sexual assault
can potentially lead to reforms on a domestic level.
16. See Timothy K. Kuhner, Note, The Status of Victims in the Enforcement of Interna-
tional Criminal Law, 6 OR. REV. INT’L L. 95, 97–98 (2004):
The existence of an international crime presupposes that the criminalized
act affects more than one nation . . . Under ordinary circumstances, a single
murder is not an international crime, but widespread and systematic mur-
der is an international crime. Concern for victims of international crimes
transcends the same concern on the domestic level in terms of its societal
relevance.
THE ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, International Prevalence of Sexual Assault in
the Military, STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, http://www.stopvaw.org/interna-
tional_prevalence_of_sexual_assault_in_the_military (last updated Aug. 2013).
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I. INTRA-MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RAPE CONSTITUTE GENDER-
BASED CRIMES OF INTERNATIONAL PROPORTIONS
In the U.S. alone, intra-military sexual crimes affect thousands of
soldiers, both male and female, each year.17 Admittedly, data regarding the
occurrence of these crimes in other countries is sparse. However, anecdotal
reports of intra-military sexual assault and militaries’ failures in dealing with
this problem have become commonplace. Despite its prevalence as an inter-
national issue, intra-military sexual assault has historically been treated by
the international community as one of domestic concern, to be taken care
of by states themselves. As is the case in the U.S., intra-military sexual as-
sault cases in other countries have traditionally been reviewed only by the
military itself, rather than by civilian courts or the civilian criminal justice
system.18 This use of military tribunals, particularly in the U.S. as discussed
in Part III, infra, has largely been inadequate to address the needs of victims
of intra-military sexual crimes.19
17. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 4 (demonstrating number of reported sexual crimes
and estimated number of actual crimes that took place).
18. See, e.g., Sandra Laville, UK Military Allowed to Investigate Sexual Assaults Without
Involving Police, GUARDIAN, Mar. 7, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/
2014/mar/07/uk-military-sexual-assaults-cases-police. However, some countries have
begun allowing military victims of sexual abuse to bring their complaints before
independent tribunals. See No Hope of Justice, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 17, 2014),
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/no-hope-justice-article-1.1722347 (pointing
to decisions of Canada, Israel, and Germany to remove sexual crime cases from the
military chain of command); see also Jackie Speier, Victims of Military Rape Deserve
Justice, CNN (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/07/opinion/speier-mili-
tary-rape/ (describing how Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom have made it
a priority to eliminate the possibility that the military’s chain of command structure
stifles the potential for prosecution).
19. First, there are flaws regarding the disciplinary process, particularly commander dis-
cretion. See COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 66–68 (discussing concerns
with the amount of discretion inherent in the system). Admittedly, Congress’ re-
forms enacted in 2013 and 2014 do remove some discretion from officers in the
court martial process and place stricter sentencing guidelines in the UCMJ. See Carl
Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2015, H.R. 3979, 113th Cong. §§ 531, 533 (2014) (enacted); National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, H.R. 3304, 113th Cong. §§ 1701–53
(2013) (enacted); David Vergun, Legislation Changes UCMJ for Victims of Sexual
Assault, U.S. ARMY (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.army.mil/article/140807/Legisla-
tion_changes_UCMJ_for_victims_of_sexual_assault/[hereinafter Vergun, Legislation
Changes UCMJ] (discussing changes made by the NDAA FY 2015); David Vergun,
New Law Brings Changes to Uniform Code of Military Justice, DEP’T OF DEF. (Jan. 8,
2014), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121444 [hereinafter
Vergun, New Law Brings Changes] (discussing the ways that the NDAA FY 2014
changed procedures). Keeping intra-military sexual assault cases within the military
is still problematic due to opportunities for mishandling given the fact that officers
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A. Rape and Sexual Assault Take Place on a Large Scale Within the U.S.
Military and Other Militaries Worldwide
Given the vast number of sexual assaults that go unreported in the
U.S. military, the actual number of intra-military sexual crimes that took
place in 2013 was probably close to 25,000.20 This number is disconcerting
and indicates a higher risk of sexual assault for members of the military than
members of the U.S. civilian population.21 Also notable is the fact that ap-
still play a role in disposition of cases and are not required to bring offenders before a
court. See, e.g., H.R. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., 113TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE RE-
PORT ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014, 717
(Comm. Print 2013) (demonstrating that officers should bring sexual assault cases
before court-martial but are not required to do so). Also, officers may still choose not
to implement a sentence imposed by court martial, although to a more limited ex-
tent than was previously the case. See H.R. 3304 at 284–85 (“Elimination of Unlim-
ited Command Prerogative and Discretion; Imposition of Additional Limitations”).
Even without direct commander control over disposition of cases, issues of bias in
dealing with sexual assault cases can come into play if intra-military sexual assault
cases are handled by the military. See LINDSAY ROSENTHAL & LAWRENCE KORB,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, TWICE BETRAYED: BRINGING JUSTICE TO THE U.S. MILI-
TARY’S SEXUAL ASSAULT PROBLEM 21 (2013) (exhorting the military to ensure com-
plete independence of all military persons who review sexual assault cases). Also,
victims of sexual assault in the military still perceive and experience roadblocks that
deter them from reporting crimes. See id. at 14, fig. 4; Jane C. Timm, Report Sexual
Assault in the Military? Expect Retaliation, MSNBC (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www
.msnbc.com/msnbc/pentagon-report-sexual-assault-military-expect-retaliation. For
further discussion of these issues, see generally Will Military Sexual Assault Survivors
Find Justice?, NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN (Mar. 19, 2014), http://now.org/resource/
will-military-sexual-assault-survivors-find-justice-issue-advisory/.
20. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 4.
21. In 2011, approximately 1.4 million active-duty and 856,000 non-active soldiers
served in the U.S. military. DEP’T OF DEF., 2011 Demographics i, vii (updated Nov.
2012) available at http://www.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/
2011_Demographics_Report.pdf. From October 2011 through September 2012
(fiscal year 2012), the Department of Defense estimates that there were approxi-
mately 26,000 unreported and around 2,800 reported sexual crimes, some of which
involved non-military perpetrators. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 4 at 71. In the
general U.S. population of 2011, less than 1 out of every 1,000 persons, or 244,000
people, were victim to a sexual assault or rape. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 239437, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2011 2–3, 9 (2012),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv11.pdf. The population was at
approximately 310 million in 2011. Robert Schlesinger, U.S. Population, 2011: 310
Million and Growing, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 30, 2010, 2:53 PM), http://www.usnews
.com/opinion/blogs/robert-schlesinger/2010/12/30/us-population-2011-310-mil-
lion-and-growing; see also Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Mili-
tary Culture, 45 DUKE L.J. 651, 662–65 (1996) (showing that “forcible” rapes
occurred more often in the U.S. military population than in the civilian population
during wartime, and that this rate diminished less in the military than the rate of
other crimes when compared to civilian crime rates during peacetime). But see
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proximately 85 percent of victims of reported intra-military sexual crimes in
2013 were women, while the percentage of reported male victims was ap-
proximately 15 percent.22 This disproportionate distribution is worth not-
ing because as of 2011, women only made up approximately 14.5 percent of
active duty U.S. armed forces.23 However, the gap between the number of
intra-military sexual assaults that males versus females report may also be
affected by differences in reporting between the genders.24
The effect that intra-military sexual crimes have on victims and the
military as a whole is enormous in terms of financial and non-financial
costs. Sexual crimes are among the most expensive non-fatal crimes the
armed forces incur each year, and they have a serious impact on the proper
functioning of the military.25 As for the victims of sexual violence, the con-
sequences are even graver.
Military victims of rape and sexual assault are often forced to live and
work alongside their attackers. The severe distress a victim experiences when
Rowan Scarborough, Doubts on Military’s Sex Assault Stats as Numbers Far Exceed
Those for the U.S., WASH. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2014/apr/6/doubts-on-militarys-sex-assault-stats-as-numbers-f/#ixzz3AD8Rp5ti (re-
porting on critical responses to the Department of Defense’s findings and
methodologies).
22. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 4, at 122, 125 (unrestricted and restricted reports).
23. By the Numbers: Women in the U.S. Military, CNN (Jan. 24, 2013 5:27 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2013/01/24/us/military-women-glance/.
24. See, e.g., Sandesh Sivakumaran, Sexual Violence Against Men in Armed Conflict, 18
EUR. J. INT’L L. 253, 255–56 (2007) (discussing underreporting by men due to
cultural stigma). It does not appear, however, that men in the military are less likely
than women to report their crimes due to fear of lack of confidentiality. See
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 28 (“60 percent of women and 36
percent of men who experienced unwanted sexual contact and did not re-
port . . . stated they [did so] because they believed the report would not be kept
confidential.”).
25. See Lindsay Hoyle, Command Responsibility—A Legal Obligation to Deter Sexual Vio-
lence in the Military, 37 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 353, 354 (2014); see also
Christine Hansen & Kate B. Summers, A Considerable Sacrifice: The Costs of Sexual
Violence in the U.S. Armed Forces, 1 YALE MANIFESTA, no. 1, 2005, at 38, 42–43
(detailing health effects and other ramifications of intra-military sexual assault);
Kathryn E. McCollister et al., The Cost of Crime to Society: New Crime-Specific Esti-
mates for Policy and Program Evaluation, 108 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE
98–109 (2010) (rape’s cost to society); Rosenthal, supra note 19, at 10 (“Our profes-
sion is built on a bedrock of trust—the trust must inherently exist among
soldiers . . . and their leaders to accomplish their mission . . . . Recent incidents of
sexual assault and sexual harassment demonstrate that we have violated that trust.”)
(quoting Gen. Ray Odierno before the Senate Armed Services Committee in June
2013).
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she26 has to face her attacker at work every day is compounded in the mili-
tary. For a soldier, the level of trust and cohesion among those who serve
together puts coworkers on a level akin to family.27 It is not surprising there-
fore, that victims of intra-military rape and sexual assault are likely to suffer
severe psychological trauma such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
severe depression, or suicidal thoughts.28 Another effect of intra-military
sexual crimes is that female victims who are stationed abroad often do not
have adequate access to abortions if they become pregnant as a result of
rape.29
Intra-military rape and sexual assault are not unique to the United
States.30 This is unsurprising, as the factors that compound the U.S.’s intra-
military sexual assault problem are present in other militaries around the
world. First, approximately 23 countries currently allow women to serve as
soldiers in their national militaries.31 As discussed infra, the presence of
women in the military has been linked to a greater prevalence of gender
discrimination in the armed forces and intra-military sexual assault. Re-
search also suggests that traditional attitudes about gender that help drive
such offenses in the U.S. military are shared by other countries.32 These
attitudes have also been shown to discourage reporting of sexual crimes and
have an effect on how sexual crimes are handled.33
26. Female-specific and male-specific pronouns are used interchangeably throughout this
Note.
27. Morris, supra note 21, at 693 (“[C]ohesion in military units is fostered by the ce-
menting of affective ties within the group, by separation of members from outside
emotional ties, by the presence of membership requirements and initiation ties, and
by the presence of an ideology or cause to which the group is committed.”).
28. ROSENTHAL, supra note 19, at 9–10.
29. In the U.S., the military currently does not pay for a female soldier’s abortion unless
she can prove she was raped. Meteor Blades, Pregnant From a Rape? That’s Double
Tough Luck if You’re a Servicewoman Seeking an Abortion, DAILY KOS (June 13, 2012,
10:55 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/13/1099668/-Pregnant-from-
a-rape-That-s-double-tough-luck-if-you-re-a-servicewoman-seeking-an-abortion#.
Even if a soldier could afford such services, she may be stationed in a country that
lacks the appropriate facilities. Id.
30. See THE ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 16. Admittedly, hard data on
the frequency of sexual assault in other countries is sparse. However, there are anec-
dotal reports that clearly signify the existence of such a problem in other countries.
See, e.g., Hauser, supra note 14; Lichfield, supra note 14; Rainey, supra note 14.
31. Women in the Military, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://.newworldencyclopedia
.org//___ (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
32. Discussed in further detail in Part III. See Joshua S. Goldstein, War and Gender,
ENCYCL. OF SEX & GENDER 107, 108 (Carol R. Ember & Melvin Ember eds.,
2003) (recognizing role of masculinity in armed forces around the world).
33. See infra Part III, Section A.
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B. Gender Discrimination is a Primary Contributor to Intra-Military Sexual
Crimes, Which Constitutes Gender-Based Crimes
1. The Problem
The inherent gender discrimination which helps drive intra-military
sexual assault makes these acts not only criminal offenses, but also gender
crimes.34 Intra-military sexual assault also constitutes a gender crime because
sexual violence has been recognized as a form of gender discrimination in
itself.35 Therefore, intra-military sexual assault should be of concern to all
within the international community dedicated to eradicating gender ine-
quality and gender-based violence.
First, both men and women experience great pressure to conform to
certain masculine norms in the military.36 These attitudes contribute to
higher rates of sexual crimes within the armed forces, deter reporting of
these crimes, and lead to a general feeling in the military that women, and
even some men, do not belong as members of its ranks.37
For instance, in France, controller-general Brigitte Debernady found
that women “are reluctant to complain because they don’t want to seem
34. See Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court [I.C.C.], Keynote Address to the
Interdisciplinary Colloquium, I.C.C. Ctr. on Law and Globalization, Sexual Violence
as International Crime: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Evidence, at 2–3 (June 16,
2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EF46BCB9-9400-450C-
B329-FFA96FD1B6A4/280530/220609seminarstateofsexualcrimes.pdf:
“[G]ender crimes” is a concept that is firmly established in the Rome Stat-
ute [of the International Criminal Court] . . . The term “gender” is defined
for the purpose of the Statute as referring to “the two sexes, male and fe-
male, within the context of society.” Various provisions of the Statute also
proscribe what can be characterised as gender crimes, such as rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy as a war crime and/or crime
against humanity.
35. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), General
Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties Under Article 2
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28 (Dec. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Recom-
mendation No. 28] (stating that gender-based violence is a form of discrimination).
36. See Goldstein, supra note 32, at 108 (recognizing role of masculinity in armed forces
around the world); Mady Wechsler Segal, Women’s Military Roles Cross-Nationally:
Past, Present, and Future, 9 GENDER & SOC’Y 757, 757–75 (1995) (connecting con-
ceptions of gender with the role of female soldiers in the military internationally);
Jennifer M. Silva, A New Generation of Women? How Female ROTC Cadets Negotiate
the Tension Between Masculine Military Culture and Traditional Femininity, 87 SO-
CIAL FORCES 937 (2008) (concluding from her study that experiencing pressure to
conform to notions of masculinity is shared among U.S. ROTC cadets).
37. See, e.g., Lichfield, supra note 14; see Morris, supra note 21, at 690, 707–09;
Sivakumaran, supra note 24, at 271.
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fragile. They say to themselves, ‘we have entered a masculine environment.
We must conform.’”38 Speaking on the topic of intra-military rape in Brit-
ain, a member of the British campaign group “Women Against Rape”
stated, “There’s no oversight; no public accountability . . . If you report it,
it’s like you’re breaking ranks . . . this is a systemic problem.”39 Similarly, a
former British soldier who was abused recalled that she “trusted [her fellow
soldiers] like brothers . . . [Reporting the crime] would be like going up to
the parents of the person who’d abused me and asking them to discipline
their child. I haven’t done anything wrong; all I’ve done is spoken out.”40
The foregoing examples are, in part, a direct consequence of anti-
quated gender norms that are an accepted part of both military culture and
the fundamentals of war embraced by the armed forces.41 These ideas not
only discourage reporting of intra-military sexual assaults, but they also help
contribute to the assaults themselves. Studies suggest that the combination
of encouragement of the masculine and discouragement of the feminine has
been identified as positively correlating with an increased incidence of sex-
ual crimes.42
In the military, soldiers are often lauded for displaying stereotypically
“masculine” characteristics, such as aggression and strength, because society
associates war with male-ness and violence.43 Equating violent behavior with
what it means to be a “man” has led to the popularization of the “macho
man” within the military: a set of personality characteristics that have been
found to positively correlate with the display of aggressive sexual behavior.44
Additionally, the military encourages soldiers to display conventionally
38. Lichfield, supra note 14.
39. Rainey, supra note 14.
40. Id.
41. See Morris, supra note 21, at 708–10; Silva, supra note 36, at 947 (claiming that men
and women in an ROTC study “drew upon traditional understandings of masculin-
ity and femininity in order to delineate between men’s work and women’s work,
linking masculinity and soldiering in a fundamental and inextricable way that is
always in juxtaposition to femininity.”); see also Goldstein, supra note 32, at 107–08
(noting that although norms of masculinity differ cross-culturally, masculinity and
gender play a role in wars of all societies).
42. Morris, supra note 21, at 701–02.
43. See id. at 708–10; see also Christine Chinkin, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in
International Law, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 326, 328–29 (1994) (discussing how inequal-
ity is linked to the occurrence of sexual crimes in armed conflict).
44. Morris, supra note 21, at 705; see also Donald L. Mosher & Ronald D. Anderson,
Macho Personality, Sexual Aggression, and Reactions to Guided Imagery of Realistic
Rape, 20 J. RES. PERSONALITY 77, 83–91 (1986) (demonstrating results of a study
that revealed a men with higher scores on a “hyper-masculinity” inventory had lower
negative emotional responses when imagining they were committing a rape, when
compared to men with lower scores on the hyper-masculinity inventory).
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“masculine” characteristics such as dominance, assertiveness, independence,
and willingness to take risks.45 Conversely, the military has historically dis-
couraged “feminine” qualities, such as compassion and compromise.46
Other forms of gender discrimination prevalent in the military also
lead to an increased incidence of sexual violence. For instance, there are
widespread attitudes towards sexuality that are linked to an increased inci-
dence of sexual violence in the armed forces:47 “rape myth acceptance,” in-
cluding the belief that women want to be raped;48 acceptance of violence
towards women;49 and acceptance of hostility towards women.50
The discrimination inherent in military culture fosters gender-based
sexual violence that harms both men and women.51 Male soldiers may be
more likely than women to remain silent about the fact that they have fallen
victim to a sexual crime.52 This is because the very same notions of mascu-
linity that contribute to sexual assault produce stigma and feelings of shame
in many male victims, prevent them from reporting sexual crimes.53 Female
soldiers, often suffer in silence as well, but are more likely to be victimized
by sexual crimes and are less likely to feel that if they report their allegation
to a superior, their allegation will be taken seriously.54
45. Morris, supra note 21, at 701.
46. See Silva, supra note 36, at 941 (“The military . . . categorically rejects prevailing
models of femininity. Indeed, self-control, assertiveness and determination combine
to form a concept of soldier that is distinctly different from our cultural understand-
ings of femininity as caring, connection and compromise.”).
47. Morris, supra note 21, at 701.
48. Id. at 702–03.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 703.
51. See Sivakumaran, supra note 24, at 260, 270 (finding that gender stereotypes play a
role in sexual violence in armed conflict against men and women).
52. See id. at 255.
53. See id.:
It is generally accepted that there is an under-reporting of rape and sexual
violence in general, and male rape and male sexual violence in particu-
lar . . . due to . . . shame, confusion, guilt, fear and stigma. Men also may
be loath to talk about being victimized, considering this incompatible with
their masculinity . . . [T]here is nothing to suggest that [this finding] does
not also pertain to male sexual violence committed in time of conflict. In-
deed, it may be argued that it would apply a fortiori in an armed conflict,
where men tend to self-identify with masculine stereotypes more strongly.
54. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 4, at 53–54 (showing that male soldiers both had a
more favorable perception of leadership support for sexual assault programs and
claimed fewer barriers to the reporting of sexual crimes when compared to female
soldiers); see also COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 15–16, 28–29 (citing
“mixed messages” in military leadership concerning rape, high concentration of
males in supervisory positions, confidentiality concerns, fear of negative conse-
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The problem of viewing women as the “other” is particularly cogent,
because most countries that have both men and women in their armed
forces do not allow women to participate in combat.55 Militaries that do
allow women to fight have only enabled women to serve in this capacity for
the past few decades, or less.56 Many men reject this fairly new presence of
women as fellow combatants, in part, because it calls into question the nor-
mative gender paradigm long-embraced as part of military culture.57
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW PROHIBITS GENDER-BASED SEXUAL CRIMES,
BUT THE SYSTEM HAS NOT HISTORICALLY RECOGNIZED
INTRA-MILITARY SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS
A. Background of the Current International Regime Vis-à-vis Sexual Assault,
Rape, and Soldier Conduct
The treatment of sexual assault, rape, and military crimes under inter-
national humanitarian, human rights, and criminal law provides a backdrop
to an understanding of how intra-military sexual crimes are handled today.
First, international humanitarian law failed to recognize an individual’s
right to be free from rape until the middle of the 20th century.58 Advances
on that front have since emerged in the field of international human rights
and criminal law, but largely for the protection of civilians, not military
personnel or soldiers.59 International humanitarian law, on the other hand,
does recognize military victims, including victims of rape. Yet, the prohibi-
tion of sexual crimes in this context has not extended to victims of intra-
military sexual crimes.
quences, lack of confidence in military justice system, and fear of retaliation as deter-
rents to reporting); Silva, supra note 36, at 945–47 (highlighting the critical nature
in which female soldiers believe they are viewed due to gender); Sara Corbett, The
Women’s War, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 18, 2007) (exemplifying the sense of futility mili-
tary victims feel regarding reporting their assaults given gender-based stereotypes).
55. See Max Fisher, Map: Which Countries Allow Women in Front-line Combat Roles?,
WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2013), www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/
2013/01/25/map-which-countries-allow-women-in-front-line-combat-roles/.
56. See id. In the U.S., it was revealed that women will be allowed to officially serve in
front-line combat beginning in 2016, making this issue even more relevant. See Tom
Vanden Brook, Pentagon Opening Front-Line Combat Roles to Women, USA TODAY
(June 18, 2013, 5:06 PM).
57. Segal, supra note 36, at 758; Silva, supra note 36, at 940.
58. Patricia Viseur Sellers, The Cultural Value of Sexual Violence, 93 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 312, 319–20 (1999).
59. Further discussed in this Section.
2015] S E X U A L  A S S A U L T  A N D  R A P E  I N  T H E  M I L I T A R Y 221
1. International Humanitarian Law
International humanitarian law is a body of rules that strive to protect
non-participants in armed conflict from the effects of war.60 Until the Mid-
dle Ages, the international community treated rape and unwanted sexual
contact as acceptable consequences of armed conflict.61 Even after this pe-
riod, when the prohibition of rape was accepted as a customary interna-
tional norm, it was clear that this prohibition was strictly for the purpose of
safeguarding civilians and preserving societal harmony.62 This notion, how-
ever, began to change in the 1920s with the introduction of the 1929 Ge-
neva Convention,63 which developed laws that governed soldiers’ behavior
when engaged in battle.64 This agreement outlawed the sexual exploitation
of females who served in the military as nurses and other aides, and out-
lawed unfair treatment due to a woman’s sex.65
The modern international humanitarian law regime began in 1949,
with the introduction of the current Geneva Convention (IV).66 Unlike ear-
lier agreements that prohibited rape for the purpose of preserving civil soci-
ety, the current Geneva Convention explicitly recognizes a (civilian) rape
victim’s individual right to be free of rape.67
2. International Criminal Law
Developed more recently, international criminal law deals with sexual
violence as well. International criminal law seeks to hold individuals ac-
countable for wrongdoings the international community agrees are particu-
larly egregious.68 The beginnings of the international criminal law regime
can be seen with the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II. As a
result of these trials, international tribunals held individual state actors re-
60. Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (July
2004), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf.
61. Sellers, supra note 58, at 315–16 (stating that rape was prohibited during this time
but there were exceptions to this prohibition during “just wars”).
62. Id.
63. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Jul. 27, 1929, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S [hereinafter Geneva Convention (III)].
64. Sellers, supra note 58, at 319–20.
65. See id.
66. See generally Geneva Convention (III), supra note 63; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (IV)].
67. See Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 66, art. 27.
68. Criminal Justice, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, https://www.ictj.org/our-
work/transitional-justice-issues/criminal-justice (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
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sponsible for various war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against
humanity.69
The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals did not acknowledge rape as a
prosecutable violation.70 However, the Tokyo tribunal did charge some de-
fendants for rape, along with other crimes committed, as acts in violation of
the customs of war.71 These trials were also significant because they repre-
sented the weakening of state sovereignty in the face of international respect
for human rights. For the first time, state actors could not only be brought
in front of an international body that could find them liable for wrongdo-
ings, but also for commission of wrongs against their own civilians.72
69. See Jocelyn Campanaro, Women, War, and International Law: The Historical Treat-
ment of Gender-Based War Crimes, 89 GEO. L.J. 2557, 2560–61, 2563–64 (2001).
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), applied in the
Nuremburg trials, defines crimes against peace as: “planning, preparation, initiation
or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy” for the
accomplishment of war crimes or crimes against humanity. See Charter of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal, annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punish-
ment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis [hereinafter IMT Charter],
art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, available at http://ava-
lon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp. The Charter defines “war crimes” as:
violations of the laws or customs of war . . . [Including], but not limited to,
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose
of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of
prisoners of war on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not
justified by military necessity.
See id. The Charter defines “crimes against humanity” as
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether
or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
See id. The accused in the Tokyo trials were also prosecuted for crimes against peace,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity under the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). See Campanaro, supra, at 2563. See
generally Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East [hereinafter
IMTFE], Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (amended Apr. 26, 1946, 4
Bevans 27). Crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes against peace are de-
fined similarly in the IMTFE and the IMT Charter applied in the Nuremburg trials.
See IMT Charter, supra, at art. 6,; IMTFE, supra, at art. 5(a)-(c).
70. Campanaro, supra note 69, at 2563.
71. THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE COURT PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST § 12
116–17 (R. John Pritchard ed., 1998, vol. 104).
72. Campanaro, supra note 69, at 2561; Sellers, supra note 58, at 320.
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In the 1990s and the early 2000s, key decisions made in the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal
Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) advanced the recognition of sexual crimes
against civilians.73 Although the tribunals’ decisions are only binding on
parties to the respective treaties, they are significant in this field of law for
their persuasive force. In each of these tribunals, governmental actors were
held directly accountable for the commission of sexual crimes.74 Two impor-
tant cases emerged that are relevant to this discussion. In 1998, the ICTR
decided Prosecutor v. Akayesu,75 where the ICTR acknowledged that rape is a
crime against humanity.76 In 2001, the ICTY issued another important de-
cision, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, where it acknowledged that rape is a war
crime, as well as a crime against humanity.77
In 2002, the modern international criminal regime emerged when the
Rome Statute entered into force, establishing the International Criminal
Court (ICC).78 The ICC has jurisdiction over the “most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole,” including genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.79 The
formation of a permanent international court, along with the statutes set
out in the Rome Statute, provided for greater recognition of the trans-
boundary nature of the world’s gravest crimes. The Rome Statute also
strengthened the role of international law in holding perpetrators of crimes
accountable. However, the Rome Statute only provides the ICC with juris-
73. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96–4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998);
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001). The Akayesu case involved the
ICTR’s prosecution of former Rwandan leader Jean-Paul Akayesu for genocide,
crimes against humanity, rape, and other violations of the Geneva Convention com-
mitted against the Tutsi people under his command in 1994. See Akayesu, ICTR 96-
4-T, paras. 686–96. The Kunarac case involved the ICTY’s prosecution of former
Bosnian Serbian army leader Dragoljub Kunarac for crimes against humanity, rape,
and other violations of the Geneva Convention during the “Foca massacres” com-
mitted against Bosnian citizens from 1992 to 1994. See Kunarac, IT-96-23-T & IT-
96-23/1-T, paras. 217–84.
74. See, e.g., Akayesu, ICTR 96-4-T, paras. 686–96; Kunarac, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/
1-T, paras. 217–84.
75. Akayesu, ICTR 96-4-T.
76. See Akayesu, ICTR 96-4-T, para. 23. The Chamber also acknowledged that rape can
constitute torture “when inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” See
id., para. 597.
77. See Kunarac, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, paras. 436-37.
78. See History of the ICC, COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow
.org/?mod=icchistory (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
79. Rome Statute of the Int’l Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
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diction over offenses involving states party to the Statute, or via reference by
the U.N. Security Council or the Prosecutor of the ICC.80 It is used as a
court of “last resort,” when national courts are inadequate, or unwilling to
prosecute a crime.81
Importantly, the Rome Statute provides greater legitimacy to sexual
crimes under international law. Rape is explicitly listed in Article 7 of the
Rome Statute as a crime against humanity, along with “other form[s] of
sexual violence of comparable gravity.”82 Rape and other sexual violence
constitute “a grave breach of the Geneva Convention” and are also recog-
nized as “war crimes” under Article 8 of the Statute.83 Additionally, in
2013, a G8 Conference held in the U.K. found that rape amounted to a
“grave breach” of the Geneva Convention.84 This had the effect of establish-
ing the prohibition of rape as a “peremptory norm,” which is a fundamental
principle of international law “from which no derogation is ever
permitted.”85
3. International Human Rights Law
International human rights law has also played an important role in
the international treatment of sexual crimes. International human rights law
is created through a body of treaties and organizations that promote cus-
toms of behavior that demand fair and equal treatment of all persons.86
International human rights law has often overlapped with international
criminal and humanitarian law, as they each share a common goal of eradi-
cating wrongdoings committed against innocent persons. Subtle differences
separate international human rights and humanitarian law, such as humani-
80. Id. art. 4(2).
81. See ICC at a Glance, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/
about%20the%20court/icc%20at%20a%20glance/Pages/icc%20at%20a%20glance
.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
82. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 7(1)(g).
83. See id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxii) (recognizing sexual crimes as a violation of the “laws and
customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework
of international law”).
84. G8, Declaration on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict, 1–2 (Apr. 11, 2013), avail-
able at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/185008/G8_PSVI_Declaration_-_FINAL.pdf.
85. Legal Information Institute, Jus cogens, CORNELL U. L. SCH., https://www.law.cor
nell.edu/wex/jus_cogens (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
86. International Human Rights Law, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/International
Law.aspx (last visited March 11, 2015).
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tarian law’s traditional focus on wartime relations.87 International human
rights law is also distinct from international criminal law, which involves set
standards applied by designated international bodies. Human rights law, on
the other hand, encompasses a broader swath of actors and behaviors.
Most significant of these international actors is the U.N., which was
created in the wake of World War II in 1945. Even though the decisions of
the post-World War II criminal tribunals reflected the international com-
munity’s commitment to the eradication of sexual crimes, the United Na-
tions actually promoted this eradication firsthand. The emergence of the
United Nations set the stage for later developments instrumental to the rec-
ognition of sexual crimes. Fundamentally, the U.N. explicitly recognizes
gender equality in the Preamble to its Charter, in the U.N. Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), and through the establishment of the U.N. Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).88
In the 1970s, CEDAW created the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women that, for the first time, out-
lawed all forms of discrimination against women,89 thus presenting such
discrimination as an international issue. Since the 1970s, CEDAW has is-
sued recommendations that are binding on all parties to the Convention.90
CEDAW has also made advances in this field by recognizing sexual violence
as a form of gender discrimination.91
87. For a discussion of the differences between international human rights and interna-
tional humanitarian law see Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights Law: The Politics of Distinction, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 299 (2011).
88. See U.N. Charter, pmbl, para. 1 (“[Pledging] to reaffirm faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of
men and women and of nations large and small.”); Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 1–2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948);
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/committee.htm (last visited Mar. 12,
2015).
89. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/180 (Dec. 18, 1978).
90. For relevant binding recommendations, see, e.g., Recommendation No. 28, supra
note 35; Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General
Recommendation No. 30, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/30 2 (Oct. 18, 2013) [here-
inafter Recommendation No. 30] (recognizing States parties’ commitment to end
conflict-related gender and sex-based violence).
91. See Recommendation No. 28, supra note 35.
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B. International Law Does not Explicitly Recognize
Intra-Military Sexual Crimes
Despite significant advances in promotion of gender equality, as well
as increased recognition of sexual crimes within the international humanita-
rian, human rights, and criminal regimes; intra-military sexual crimes and
the gender discrimination that helps drive these offenses are not explicitly
recognized under international law.92 This lack of explicit recognition is
problematic when juxtaposed with the international community’s efforts to
advance gender equality and international law’s unquestionable prohibition
of sexual crimes generally.
As mentioned in Section A, supra, the international humanitarian law
regime emerged to regulate soldiers’ conduct vis-à-vis civilians, and it con-
demns wrongful conduct such as rape.93 Meanwhile, humanitarian treaty
provisions that protect soldiers from wrongful conduct only do so when
such wrongs are committed at the hands of enemy soldiers.94
As for international criminal law, the ICC is the most promising actor
within that regime, given its power to enforce compliance with laws against
individuals perpetrating sex crimes. The crimes under the Rome Statute –
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, however, do not explic-
itly cover intra-military sexual violence.95 “Genocide” requires intent to de-
stroy a group, which does not properly cover the crimes at issue here.96
“Crimes against humanity” can only be committed against civilians under
the Statute and therefore also does not fit.97 Similarly, “war crimes” prima-
rily deal with grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, which only covers
civilian victims.98
92. Admittedly, the use of international criminal law via the ICC is reserved for rare
occasions. The legal principles that the ICC’s Rome Statute has set forth, however,
have been useful for the role it has played within the international human rights
regime and will be referred to for this purpose. Also, some failures of the interna-
tional human rights system regarding these issues can be traced back to the flaws of
international law more generally, such as comity and sovereignty concerns that make
it difficult to hold actors accountable under international law. These problems, for
the most part, are not addressed here.
93. See Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 66, art. 27.
94. See, e.g., Geneva Convention (III), supra note 63, art. 5 (“The present Convention
shall apply to the persons . . . from the time they fall into the power of the enemy.”).
95. See Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 5–9; see also The Crime of Aggression, COAL.
FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression (last
visited Mar. 26, 2015) (noting that the “crime of aggression” in the Rome Statute
has yet to be defined and, as such, the Court has been unable to enforce it).
96. See Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 6.
97. See id., art. 7.
98. See id., art. 8; Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 66, art. 4.
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Meanwhile, international human rights law also fails to explicitly
cover intra-military sexual violence. This is the case despite the fact that this
area of law strives to promote equality for all persons and provides for trea-
ties and declarations that outlaw rape and promote gender equality.99
III. U.S. DOMESTIC LAW DOES NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS
INTRA-MILITARY SEXUAL CRIMES
A. U.S. Domestic Law’s Handling of Military Rape and Sexual Assault
Soldiers’ conduct vis-à-vis their compatriots is primarily seen as a do-
mestic issue to be dealt with by the soldiers’ country directly. This is the
case even when a soldier stationed abroad commits an offense and could
therefore fall under the jurisdiction of another country, primarily due to the
existence of status of forces agreements. Status of forces agreements set out
which country has jurisdiction over criminal acts committed by foreign
troops stationed on their soil.100 Even if such agreements are not in place,
intra-military crimes that take place on foreign soil are typically dealt with
by the military’s nation as a matter of comity, or legal reciprocity.101
In the U.S., intra-military crimes are governed by the military’s own
justice system. The rules that govern all military crimes are codified in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).102 Congress established the
UCMJ in 1951 in accordance with its “military powers” under Article 1,
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.103 The UCMJ expressly prohibits rape
99. See, e.g., U.N. Charter, pmbl., supra note 88 (“[Pledging] to reaffirm faith in funda-
mental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966); The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 88; Recommenda-
tion No. 30, supra note 90 (recognizing states’ parties commitment to end conflict-
related gender and sex-based violence); Recommendation No. 28, supra note 35,
para. 19 (gender-based sexual violence as a form of gender discrimination); see also
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984 (outlawing tor-
ture, which can be construed to cover acts of sexual violence).
100. Mark E. Eichelman, International Criminal Jurisdiction Issues for the United States
Military, THE ARMY LAWYER, Aug. 2000, at 23, 23–24.
101. See Morris, supra note 21, at 685–87 (recognizing under-enforcement of interna-
tional prohibitions of rape in general and against military personnel in particular).
102. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–941 (Westlaw through P.L.
113–296 (excluding P.L. 113–235, 113–287, and 113–291)).
103. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”).
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and sexual assault.104 Sexual assault and rape of women within its ranks are
problems the military has been dealing with since women began working
with the armed forces as military personnel.105 Sexual assault of men pre-
dated this time period, but there is far less data available on these
incidents.106
Despite the media attention surrounding several scandals involving in-
tra-military sexual assault in the 1990s and early 2000s,107 the Department
of Defense did not take substantial action to deal with the issue until 2004,
following media attention regarding intra-military sexual assaults of soldiers
in Iraq and Kuwait.108 In light of these events, then-Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld commanded the military to establish the Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO).109 SAPRO trains and educates
military personnel on issues related to sexual assault and provides victims
with non-legal assistance related to their assaults.110
When a military victim of sexual assault wants to bring a complaint
alleging that a sexual crime took place, he can file an unrestricted or re-
stricted report with SAPRO through the assistance of a Sexual Assault Re-
104. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 920 (Westlaw through P.L.
113–296 (excluding P.L. 113–235, 113–287, and 113–291)). However, Depart-
ment of Defense directives for programs dealing with wrongful sexual conduct refer
to both rape and sexual assault as “sexual assault.” See DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE
NO. 6495.01 21 (amended Jan. 20, 2015), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/
directives/corres/pdf/649501p.pdf.
105. See Jenna Grassbaugh, The Opaque Glass Ceiling: How Will Gender Neutrality in
Combat Affect Military Sexual Assault Prevalence, Prevention, and Prosecution?, 11
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 319, 322–24 (2014).
106. See Sivakumaran, supra note 24, at 255.
107. Of note was the “Tailhook” incident that took place at an annual Tailhook Associa-
tion meeting in Las Vegas in 1992. This incident involved the sexual assault of 83
women and 7 men by fellow service members followed by a military cover-up. See
Rosenthal, supra note 19, at 7. Also, in 1996, the Aberdeen training base became the
center of a scandal when “rampant sex and abuse of authority among male drill
sergeants and the female soldiers whose lives they virtually controlled” was discov-
ered. See Jackie Spinner, In Wake of Sex Scandal, Caution is the Rule at Aberdeen,
WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/long-
term/library/aberdeen/caution.htm. In 2004, the media focused attention on the
many reports of sexual assault of female service members in Afghanistan and Iraq.
See Ann Scott Tyson, Reported Cases of Sexual Assault in Military Increase, WASH.
POST (May 7, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2005/05/06/AR2005050601355.html.
108. See DEP’T OF DEF., MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE (Feb. 10, 2004), available at http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/laws/
d20040213satf.pdf.
109. See SAPRO, Mission & History, supra note 3; Rosenthal, supra note 19, at 7.
110. See SAPRO, Mission & History, supra note 3.
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sponse Coordinator (SARC), or a victim advocate.111 An unrestricted report
enables victims to initiate a criminal investigation through the Military
Criminal Investigation Organizations (MCIO).112 At this point, the victim
can file a protective order, or request to be transferred to another unit and
receive medical services.113 A restricted report, on the other hand, allows
victims to access medical and mental health services confidentially.114 If the
victim files a restricted report, no investigation is initiated and the perpetra-
tor’s name is not revealed to commanders.115 Victims who file either type of
report are entitled to general legal counsel.116
Once an MCIO determines that there is sufficient evidence that an
offense occurred, the alleged offender’s superior commanders make an inde-
pendent finding to determine if the evidence substantiates a sexual assault
claim and subsequently decide how to proceed.117 An officer can choose to
recommend the case to a court-martial (military court);118 or initiate a non-
judicial punishment, an administrative discharge, or other administrative
action.119 Common non-judicial punishments are reduction in rank, forfei-
ture, extra duty, restrictions, confinement or custodial custody, or repri-
mands.120 If found guilty before a court-martial, discipline for sexual
offenses typically range from one or more of: discharge, confinement, reduc-
tion in rank, or forfeiture of pay.121
111. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 18–19.
112. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 4, at 28.
113. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 18.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 26. However, the NDAA FY 2015 also makes a “special victims counsel”
attorney available to each military sexual assault victim. See Carl Levin and Howard
P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, H.R.
3979, 113th Cong. §§ 531, 533 (2014) (enacted).
117. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 4, at 80; COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at
59–66.
118. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES (2012) II-31, R. 401 (“For-
warding and disposition of charges in general”), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/
frd/Military_Law/pdf/MCM-2012.pdf. But see National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2014, H.R. 3304, 113th Cong., at 283 (2013) (enacted) (requiring,
“whenever practicable,” an impartial judge advocate rather than a commanding of-
ficer to determine whether there is probable cause to charge the accused with an
offense before court-martial).
119. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 4, at 78.
120. See id. at 83.
121. See id. at 81–82. The Department of Defense report shows that in fiscal year 2013,
those subjects who were convicted by court-martial were subject to either: confine-
ment, reduction in rank, fines/forfeitures, discharge, or dismissal. See id. at 81–83.
Most of the individuals who were not brought before a court-martial where evidence
supported a finding of sexual assault received a non-judicial punishment of reduction
in rank, forfeiture of pay, a restriction of liberty for a period of time, and extra duty.
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In 2013, “identified” service member on service member sexual as-
saults made up 61 percent of unrestricted reports of military sexual as-
sault.122 Therefore, data representing the disposition of sexual assault cases
as a whole may not represent the disposition of intra-military cases with
exact precision. Regardless, of the 1,187 sexual assault cases123 commanders
determined were substantiated by sufficient evidence in 2013, 71 percent
were brought before a court-martial.124 Of the court-martial proceedings
that were completed in 2013, 68 percent proceeded to trial, while the re-
mainder were dismissed, resulted in an officer’s discharge or resignation, or
were handled through non-judicial punishment.125
Of the cases that proceeded to trial, 76 percent or 370 subjects, were
convicted of a charge.126 This number represents 11 percent of total un-
restricted reports of sexual assault (intra-military or otherwise).127 It also
means that 23 percent of cases where the military had jurisdiction over an
offense and an MCIO determined that evidence substantiated a sexual as-
sault charge, resulted in a sentence by court-martial.128 It is also worth not-
ing that commanding officers are still not required to impose a court-
See id. at 85. Others received an administrative discharge or “other adverse adminis-
trative action.” See id. at 81–82.
122. Id. at 73.
123. The Department of Defense could not consider action in 1,085 of its 3,234 total
(intra-military and otherwise) unrestricted reports of sexual assault. Approximately
60 percent of these cases could not proceed because of jurisdictional issues or other
technical issues, e.g. when a civilian was accused of committing the offense. Id. at 77.
The remainder of these cases (437) were not be pursued because an MCIO found
them to be unsubstantiated. Id. The Department therefore considered 2,149 sexual
assault cases for possible commander action in 2013. Id. at 78. Of these cases, evi-
dence substantiated a finding of some misconduct in 1,569 (73 percent). Id. Evi-
dence substantiated a finding of sexual assault in 1,187 of these cases. Id. 382 cases
resulted instead in a finding of “other misconduct.” Id.
124. Id. at 78, 81. The percentage of sexual assault cases that were heard before a court-
martial in 2013 was considerably higher than in previous years. See id. at 80 (show-
ing an increase in the use of court-martial from 57 percent of all cases where miscon-
duct, sexual or otherwise, was substantiated pursuant to a sexual assault investigation
in 2009 to 73 percent of all such cases in 2013).
125. Id. at 83.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 77–83.
128. See id.
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martial’s sentence on a perpetrator,129 although officers’ discretion in this
regard has been limited by the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act.130
B. The U.S. Legal System Does Not Properly Deter or Acknowledge Intra-
Military Sexual Assault and Rape
1. The Military Justice System
Although the military has improved how it reports and manages sexual
crimes including increasing the overall support available for sexual assault
victims,131 the military justice system is still an improper venue for the pros-
ecution of intra-military sexual assault crimes. As demonstrated above, most
sexual assault cases that are substantiated do not result in court-martial
charges. This means that a great number of cases not only do not go to trial,
but also result in lesser charges such as dismissal, reduction in rank, or
fines.132 This is not surprising, as the military justice system itself is not
129. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, H.R. 3304, 113th
Cong., at 284–85 (2013) (“Elimination of Unlimited Command Prerogative and
Discretion; Imposition of Additional Limitations”) (enacted)
If a mandatory minimum sentence exists for a charge, the convening au-
thority . . . may not modify an adjudged sentence . . . This limitation does
not restrict the discretion of the convening authority . . . to modify, disap-
prove, commute, or suspend any portion of the adjudicated sentence that is
in addition to the mandatory minimum sentence.
130. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, H.R. 3304, 113th
Cong., at 284–85 (2013) (enacted).
131. As mentioned above, the Department of Defense has improved its services for mili-
tary sexual assault victims over the past several years. Congress now requires the
military to keep a reporting system of its sexual assault policies and disposition of
sexual assault allegations. See Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2011, H.R. 6523, 111th Cong. § 1631(d) (2011) (enacted). SAPRO
provides military sexual assault victims with a comprehensive system that helps them
report their attacks and obtain health services. SAPRO, Mission & History, supra note
3. The NDAA FY 2014 in particular brings changes that remove some of command-
ing officers’ discretion over disposition of sexual assault offenses. See National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, H.R. 3304, 113th Cong. §§ 1701–53
(2013) (enacted); Vergun, New Law Brings Changes, supra note 19 (explaining these
changes). The NDAA FY 2015 also makes a “special victims counsel” attorney avail-
able to each military sexual assault victim. See Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’
McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, H.R. 3979,
113th Cong. § 533 (2014) (enacted).
132. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 4, at 81–82, 85 (demonstrating that most of the
individuals convicted of sexual assault but not brought before court-martial were
punished through administrative discharge, reduction in rank, forfeiture of pay, a
restriction of liberty, and/or extra duty).
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suited to take up sexual assault claims, particularly those involving intra-
military sexual assault.
First, disposition of cases still heavily involves officers in the accused’s
chain of a command.133 Yet, even if the control an accused’s superiors have
over the disposition of a sexual assault case is lessened or eliminated, con-
flicts of interest arise.134 Also, the purpose behind providing the military
with practically exclusive jurisdiction over many offenses committed by its
members is because the military is best suited to handle these crimes.135
This is not the case for intra-military sexual assaults.
For instance, when evaluating crimes committed by a soldier under
the UCMJ, officers can take into consideration important, military-related
factors that may impact a soldier’s decision to commit an offense. The abil-
ity to evaluate the goals of a soldier’s mission when an offense was commit-
ted is outside the realm of civilian expertise and potentially important to
national and international security. These factors do not apply to cases of
sexual assault, as no such offense could possibly be committed incident to
133. See COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 59–66 (detailing the involvement of
the accused’s commanding officers in the disposition of sexual assault cases); MAN-
UAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 118, at II-25, R. 306 (“Each commander has
discretion to dispose of offenses by members of that command. Ordinarily the im-
mediate commander of a person accused or suspected of committing an offense tria-
ble by court-martial initially determines how to dispose of that offense.”); see also
Jeremy W. Peters & Emmarie Huetteman, Gillibrand Seeks Another Vote on Military’s
Handling of Sexual Assault Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes
.com/2014/12/03/us/senators-renew-push-for-bill-on-sexual-assault-in-military.html
(detailing how some senators still find the chain of command’s involvement in mili-
tary sexual assault cases problematic).
134. See Sexual Assault in the Military Part Three: Context and Causes, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H.R. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform, 111th Cong. 3–4 (2009) (statement of Elizabeth Hillman, Ph.D., J.D., Law
Professor at the University of California Hastings):
Although commanders must lead the way in changing military culture, they
are neither essential nor well-suited for their current role in the legal process
of criminal prosecution . . . [T]he Uniform Code of Military Justice contin-
ues to require that convening authorities exercise prosecutorial discretion.
This mixture of roles, in which a convening authority must protect the
overall well-being of a unit and ensure the unit’s mission is accomplished as
well as decide whether a specific factual context warrants prosecution, cre-
ates a conflict that cuts in different directions, all unhealthy.
See also NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, supra note 19 (recognizing conflicts of interest as
many officers overseeing sexual assault cases work with the accused).
135. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974) (citing Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137,
140 (1953)) (“Just as military society has been a society apart from civilian society,
so ‘(m)ilitary law . . . is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law
which governs in our federal judicial establishment.’”).
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service or for the “greater good” of a mission or security.136 Also, the level of
expertise that military officials have when dealing with crimes committed in
the line of duty does not carry over to sexual assault cases.
Furthermore, the potential for abuses in intra-military sexual cases is
great, as demonstrated by the military’s track record regarding these types of
cases. Despite reforms, military victims of sexual assault still experience re-
taliation for reporting.137 More fundamentally, the military environment re-
mains poorly situated for handling intra-military sexual crimes given the
prevalence of gender discrimination, discussed in Part III.138
2. Civilian Courts
In response to these inadequacies, some victims of intra-military sex-
ual assault and rape have looked to the civilian court system to address the
pervasive problem of intra-military assault in the U.S.139 Two such cases,
Cioca v. Rumsfeld140 and Klay v. Panetta,141 were brought in 2013 and 2014
by American military victims of sexual misconduct, including sexual assault.
In Cioca and Klay, victims brought tort suits against military officials claim-
ing violations of various constitutional rights. In particular, claimants al-
leged that the U.S. military’s mishandling of their sexual misconduct cases
violated their Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection rights,
their First Amendment rights to free speech, and their Seventh Amendment
rights to trial by jury.142
136. Arguments that the military’s handling of intra-military sexual assault cases is still a
“military matter” have kept intra-military sexual assault plaintiffs out of civilian
court. See Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 515–16 (4th Cir. 2013); Klay v.
Panetta, 758 F.3d 369, 374–76 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Still, the Fourth Circuit’s conclu-
sion in Cioca had little to do with the purposes behind having a separate justice
system for civilians and the military. Instead, the holding rested the court’s reluc-
tance to become involved in judgments of the merits of the United States’ “military
decisions.” See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 516. The D.C. Circuit’s came to its conclusion in
Klay based on similar grounds but also emphasized separation of powers concerns.
See Klay, 758 F.3d at 374–76.
137. Timm, supra note 19.
138. See supra Part II, Section B.
139. For a discussion, see Woods, supra note 11.
140. Cioca, 720 F.3d 505.
141. Klay, 758 F.3d 369.
142. See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 507; Klay, 758 F.3d at 371. “[Plaintiffs claim] Fifth Amend-
ment rights to bodily integrity, due process, and equal protection; a First Amend-
ment right to speak about their assaults without retaliation; and a Seventh
Amendment right to have juries try their assailants.” Klay, 758 F.3d at 372. In Cioca:
Plaintiffs . . . allege[d] in the Complaint that the Defendants violated their
constitutional rights by, inter alia, “fail[ing] to (1) investigate rapes and
sexual assaults, (2) prosecute perpetrators, (3) provide an adequate judicial
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The Cioca and Klay plaintiffs requested damages by means of a Bivens
action.143 A Bivens action provides a cause of action for certain constitu-
tional violations where there is no explicit cause of action provided by
law.144 Bivens suits against military personnel or government officials who
oversee the military are constrained by the Feres Doctrine, articulated in the
1950 Supreme Court case Feres v. U.S.145 The Feres Doctrine provides that
individuals cannot bring federal tort claims under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) against the government for injuries arising out of or in the
course of activity “incident to military service.”146
The authority behind Feres’ military exception stems from constitu-
tional separation of powers principles. Feres reminds courts that they should
refrain from evaluating military tort claims in deference to congressional
control of the military under Article I of the Constitution.147 However,
courts are not explicitly prohibited from deciding these cases.148 Although
Feres has a large number of critics, even on the Supreme Court, recent deci-
sions have reinforced the doctrine and it is binding.149 Feres now extends
beyond FTCA claims to encompass tort claims for damages under Bivens as
well.150
The Cioca and Klay plaintiffs tried to get around Feres by arguing that
the military’s failures in handling sexual misconduct cases were not related
system as required by the Uniform Military Justice Act, and (4) abide by
Congressional deadlines to implement Congressionally-ordered institu-
tional reforms to stop rapes and other sexual assaults.”
Cioca, 720 F.3d at 507 (quoting Plaintiffs’ original complaint).
143. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
144. Federal Practice Manual, SARGENT SHRIVER NATIONAL CENTER ON POVERTY LAW
http://federalpracticemanual.org/node/30 (“Implied Constitutional Causes of Action
for Damages”) (last updated 2013).
145. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
146. See Feres, 340 U.S. 135 at 144.
147. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682–83 (1987) (interpreting Feres).
148. See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 681–82.
149. See Francine Banner, Immoral Waiver: Judicial Review of Intra-Military Sexual Assault
Claims, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 723, 725–26 (2013):
Since the 1950s, Feres has been expansively interpreted to bar justiciability
of claims by military personnel against superior officers not only for negli-
gence and intentional torts, but also for blatant violations of constitutional
rights. Despite the strong disapproval of several Supreme Court justices and
countless district and appellate courts, the Court has denied certiorari in
recent cases challenging application of the doctrine, thus further en-
trenching it.
150. See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683–84.
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to military matters. However, they were unsuccessful.151 Both of these cases
failed on appeal in the Fourth and D.C. Circuits, respectively. The courts
found that providing a damages remedy under these circumstances would
violate Feres’ “incident to military service” principle and would implicate
separation of powers concerns by allowing the judiciary to interfere with
Congress’ military powers.152 Their efforts thus reinforce the futility of us-
ing civil tort claims to redress intra-military sexual assault in light of Feres.
IV. VICTIMS OF INTRA-MILITARY SEXUAL CRIMES CAN USE
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS
AND IN CLAIMS BROUGHT BEFORE INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES
Gender discrimination, particularly gender role stereotyping, is a ma-
jor impetus behind intra-military sexual assault committed against both
men and women in the U.S., as well as in militaries around the world.153 As
discussed supra, both the military itself and the U.S. civilian court system
are inadequate at handling intra-military sexual assault cases. The military
provides a relatively small percentage of intra-military sexual assault victims
with the opportunity to see offenders face severe penalties.154 Meanwhile, by
choosing not to take up intra-military sexual assault cases in civilian courts,
the American legal system implicitly sends the message to military sexual
assault victims that their injuries are not as severe as those of civilian sexual
assault victims.
As sexual crimes are often rooted in gender discrimination,155 the way
sexual crimes are addressed can have the unintended consequence of con-
doning such discrimination. Also, as the presence of women in the military
challenges stereotypical gender norms, the struggles female intra-military
151. Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 514–16 (4th Cir. 2013); Klay v. Panetta, 758
F.3d 369, 374–76 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
152. See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 515–16; Klay, 758 F.3d at 374–76 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also
Banner, supra note 149 (criticizing the Feres doctrine’s application to intra-military
sexual assault cases).
153. See supra Part I, Section B.
154. See discussion supra pp. 122–24. The statistics referred to on pages 122 to 124 are
compounded by the fact that only approximately 10 percent of intra-military sexual
assault victims report their sexual assaults in the first place. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra
note 4, at 71 (showing that, in the year 2012, survey results suggested that nearly
26,000 members of the U.S. military experienced unwanted sexual contact, while
only 2,828 service members actually reported such crimes, meaning that 10 percent
of victims reported their crimes). For more detail on reporting of intra-military sex-
ual assault in the U.S., see COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 17–43.
155. See Recommendation No. 28, supra note 35 (describing sexual violence as a form of
gender discrimination).
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sexual assault victims face in their pursuit of justice sends the message that
breaking down gender normative barriers will result in adverse conse-
quences. Additionally, the failure to properly handle these assaults infringes
upon victims’ right to be free of sexual assault, an undisputed human right.
The international system traditionally did not attempt to address in-
tra-military sexual crimes.156 Yet, this landscape is changing. Under treaty
law, international human rights bodies are beginning to address complaints
from intra-military sexual assault victims regarding their respective govern-
ments’ inadequate responses to intra-military sexual assault.157 Given sover-
eignty concerns and the structure of the international system, international
bodies themselves are not effective for handling inter-military sexual assault
cases directly.158 However, international law as articulated by these bodies
can be used as a catalyst for change on a domestic level by strengthening
international customary law in this area.159
Intra-military sexual assault victims, in the U.S. and around the globe,
can petition international human rights bodies. Specifically, they can re-
quest acknowledgement of the failures of their government to properly
manage and provide independent oversight of intra-military sexual assault in
violation of customary international human rights law. In countries that still
lack independent oversight of intra-military sexual assaults on par with that
provided in civilian courts, this move may help strengthen acknowledge-
ment of intra-military sexual crimes. Also, international recognition that the
status quo regarding the treatment of intra-military sexual assault in the
U.S. is in violation of international law may work to advance congressional
efforts to eliminate military control of intra-military sexual assault cases
entirely.
156. See supra Part II.
157. U.S. victims of intra-military sexual misconduct brought claims before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. See Int’l Human Rights Clinic, supra note
13. An intra-military sexual assault victim from the U.K. has expressed a desire to
bring claims of human rights violations against the U.K. in the European Court. See
Rainey, supra note 14.
158. See Morris, supra note 21, at 685; see, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4 (Aug. 2) (establishing “territoriality principle” of inter-
national law, which allows sovereign states to act however they wish within their own
territory, so long as it does not violate an explicit provision of international law);
Kuhner, supra note 16, at 102, 107–17 (discussing political concerns in the interna-
tional system and states’ avoidance of the I.C.C.); Catharine A. MacKinnon, The
ICTR’s Legacy on Sexual Violence, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 211, 218–20
(2008) (discussing failures of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda).
159. Rozzbeh B. Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old Challenges
and New Debates, 21 EU. J. OF INT’L L. 173, 175 (2010).
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A. Customary International Law Prohibits the Injustices Intra-Military
Sexual Assault Victims Experience
Custom is defined as “an authentic expression of the needs and values
of the community at any given time.”160 Article 38(1)(b) of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice Statute defines customary international law as “evi-
dence of a general practice accepted as law.”161 The acceptance of a
particular legal concept as customary international law is traditionally exem-
plified in two ways. First, nation-states must behave in conformity with the
law.162 Second, nations must do so under the belief that they are under
obligation of law to act in this way, known as opinio juris.163
The number of states who behave in accordance with the international
custom generally has to be a large enough group of nation-states to consti-
tute some sort of critical consensus.164 This behavior must be consistent
over a prolonged period of time.165 Evidence of states’ behavior can be ob-
tained through state officials’ explicit statements or deduced by means of a
collection of sources such as resolutions and decisions of international bod-
ies, national court decisions, treaties, and the general practice of interna-
tional organizations.166 Customary international law has its critics who
question its effectiveness.167 Yet, it is still a recognized and important form
of international law.168
Since the 1970s, scholars have begun to challenge strict adherence to
states’ behavior and opinio juris as necessary to the formation of customary
international law.169 These scholars argue that customary international law,
particularly on human rights issues, is increasingly established through the
means of widely accepted treaties and the jurisprudence developed by inter-
160. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (6th ed. 2008).
161. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(B), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
162. Shaw, supra note 160, at 74. Behavior may include omissions in some circumstances.
Andre de la Rocha Ferreira et al., Int’l L. Commission, Formation and Evidence of
Customary International Law, 1 UFRGS MODEL U.N. J., 2013, at 182, 189.
163. Shaw, supra note 160, at 74. Admittedly, there are not clear standards used to dis-
cern whether a state is truly behaving out of a sense of legal obligation. See id. at
86–87; see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary Interna-
tional Law 1 (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 63, 1999)
(observing the widespread lack of clarity in this area).
164. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 172 (2010).
165. Shaw, supra note 160, at 76–77.
166. See id. at 82–83.
167. Id. at 73–74.
168. See id. at 74.
169. Baker, supra note 159, at 173–74.
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national criminal tribunals.170 This form of customary international law is
seen as binding even on states who are not signatories to the requisite con-
vention, or participants in a particular criminal tribunal’s decision.171 U.N.
Resolutions have also been seen by some as evidence of customary interna-
tional law.172
It can be argued that customary international law, through a collective
of international treaties, decisions of international bodies, and U.N. resolu-
tions, already prohibits intra-military sexual crimes. Through the sum of
these sources, which were mentioned explicitly in Part II, supra,173 as well as
others, the prohibition of sexual violence in general is now widely accepted
to be a matter of customary international human rights law.174 Under the
auspices of international customary law, the international community has
increasingly been committed to punishing all who are responsible for sexual
violence.175 The prohibitions against sexual violence extend within the bor-
ders of sovereign nations and to military actors, both in times of peace and
conflict.176
Although most explicit prohibitions of sexual violence were created
with civilians in mind,177 the prohibition under customary law does not
make any exception preventing its application to protect soldiers. Instead,
all persons are to be protected by human rights law, and all nations are
170. Id. at 174–75, 178–83.
171. See id. at 174–75, 180–81.
172. See id. at 181.
173. See, e.g., Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 66, art. 27 (“Women shall be especially
protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”); Rome Statute, supra note 79, art.
8(2)(b) (recognizing sexual crimes as a violation of the “laws and customs applicable
in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international
law”); G8 supra note 84, para. 1 (“Sexual violence in armed conflict represents one of
the most serious forms of violation or abuse of international humanitarian law and
international human rights law.”).
174. Rule 93. Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS
(https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule93) (last visited Mar. 14,
2015).
175. See id.; J.-M. Henckaerts, Annex. List of Customary Rules of International Humanita-
rian Law, 87 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, no. 857, Mar. 2005, at 198, 211–12,
available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-law-rules.pdf. As
demonstrated earlier, individuals have been held accountable under particular trea-
ties for commission and support of sexual crimes within their borders. See, e.g., Pros-
ecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001).
176. See id. For further discussion, see supra Part II, Section A.
177. See, e.g., Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 66, art. 4 (protected persons).
2015] S E X U A L  A S S A U L T  A N D  R A P E  I N  T H E  M I L I T A R Y 239
charged with following these laws.178 Therefore, there is a strong argument
in favor of finding governments in violation of international customary law
for failure to properly control their intra-military sexual assault problems.
B. Changing the Way Intra-Military Sexual Assault is Handled Through
Customary International Law
As mentioned before, some intra-military sexual assault victims are
beginning to bring complaints regarding government handling of intra-mili-
tary sexual assault before regional human rights groups, basing their com-
plaints on regional human rights treaties. These victims should continue
this practice, as it will increase international recognition of the mishandling
of intra-military sexual assault cases across different regional human rights
bodies. Victims can also bring complaints based on treaty law before the
U.N. Human Rights Committee, which can issue recommendations to
states party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.179
Additionally, victims can raise the issue as one of gender discrimination
before CEDAW.180
Although these acts may not seem like much, these international
claims can help add to the mass of treaties and other international acts that
support the status of intra-military sexual crimes as a matter of customary
international law. As customary international law applies to all states, even
within their borders, it has the potential to be stronger than prohibition via
treaty alone. States will hopefully pay greater attention to these issues as a
result of international acknowledgement in this area. Ultimately, states
should aim to allow an independent civilian body to handle intra-military
sexual assault cases and should work to reform aspects of military culture
that contribute to sexual assault.
In the U.S., positioning intra-military sexual assaults under interna-
tional human rights law may help push Congress in the direction towards
removing intra-military sexual assault cases from military control. Indeed, a
number of bills challenging the military’s control over these cases have been
178. See U.N. Charter, pmbl., supra note 88, para. 1 (“[Pledging] to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”); Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, supra note 88, arts. 1–2.
179. See Human Rights Committee, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM.
RTS. (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx) (last
visited Mar. 14, 2015).
180. See generally Recommendation No. 28, supra note 35 (finding that sexual violence is
a form of gender discrimination).
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proposed in different forms for the past two years.181 Meanwhile, Congress
has instated modest reforms that lessened military control over these cases in
its 2014 and 2015 National Defense Authorization acts.182 Some members
of Congress who supported reforms of the military’s handling of sexual as-
sault cases even pointed to recent efforts by some countries to put in place
independent civilian oversight for intra-military sexual assault cases.183
Thus, it is not radical to assume that international influence may have some
effect on congressional handling of the military’s sexual assault problem.
If Congress is able to eliminate the military’s control over the disposi-
tion of intra-military sexual assault cases to a greater degree or in its entirety,
the Supreme Court may finally be able to re-consider the applicability of the
Feres doctrine to intra-military sexual assault cases.184 For support, the
Court can look to customary international law as a means of re-thinking its
interpretation of Feres’ “incident to military service” principle.185 Viewing
intra-military sexual assault as a human rights issue should aid the Court in
rejecting Feres’ application to intra-military sexual assault cases, given its
commitment to international human rights concerns when interpreting
constitutional issues.186
181. See, e.g., Military Justice Improvement Act, S. 1752, 113th Cong. (2013); STOP
Act, H.R. 1593, 113th Cong. (2013).
182. See Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2015, H.R. 3979, 113th Cong. §§ 531–38 (2014) (enacted); Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, H.R. 3304, 113th Cong.
§§ 1701–53 (2013) (enacted). For an explanation of these changes see Vergun, New
Law Brings Changes and Vergun, Legislation Changes UCMJ, supra note 19.
183. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 9; Editorials and OpEds in Support of the Military Justice
Improvement Act, KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, U.S. SENATOR FOR N.Y. (http://www.gil-
librand.senate.gov/mjia/editorials) (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
184. See supra Part III, Section B.
185. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950). For a discussion on the use of
customary international human rights law in U.S. courts, see Kathleen M. Kedian,
Customary International Law and International Human Rights Litigation in United
States Courts: Revitalizing the Legacy of the Paquete Habana, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1395 (1999).
186. To look to customary international law when interpreting U.S. constitutional law is
by no means unheard of. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., International Law at Home:
Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 41, 89–90 (2012); see also.,
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 604–05 (2005) (finding the juvenile death pen-
alty unconstitutional in part due to widespread prohibition of capital punishment
for juveniles as a matter of international customary law); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 316 n.21 (2002) (citing worldwide disapproval of imposing the death penalty
on “mentally retarded” perpetrators); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
830–31 (1988) (“The conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency
to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense is
consistent with the views that have been expressed . . . by other nations that share
our Anglo-American heritage, and by leading members of the Western European
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V. CONCLUSION
Intra-military sexual assault is a problem that harms thousands around
the world each year. Historically, both international law and domestic law,
particularly in the U.S., have failed to provide intra-military sexual assault
victims with adequate recourse for their suffering. Indeed, despite reforms in
the U.S., traditional notions of gender and gender discrimination still per-
vade military culture and continue to contribute to the frequency of these
offenses. These gendered beliefs and other biases should evoke the concern
of those in the international community committed to advancing gender
equality. More fundamentally, the gender issues pervasive in the armed
forces make the military an improper venue for the handling of intra-mili-
tary sexual assault cases.
However, in the U.S. and in other countries as well, intra-military
sexual assault cases are still investigated and tried by the military itself. For
the most part, this results in a failure to provide intra-military sexual assault
victims with independent investigation and review of these offenses on par
with what civilian sexual assault victims receive. This unequal treatment still
continues in the U.S. and elsewhere in the world. Hopefully, by catego-
rizing the crime of intra-military sexual assault as an international human
rights issue, intra-military sexual crimes will be afforded greater recognition,
encouraging policy changes on a domestic level.
community.”); see also AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., “A DECENT RESPECT TO THE OPINIONS
OF MANKIND. . .” SELECTED SPEECHES BY JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
ON FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 102 (Christopher J. Borgen ed., 2007)
(quoting Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer):
[W]e find an increasing number of issues, including constitutional issues,
where the decisions of foreign courts help by offering points of comparison.
This change reflects the ‘globalization’ of human rights, a phrase that refers
to the ever-stronger consensus (now nearly worldwide) on the importance
of protecting basic human rights . . . and the related decision to enlist
independent judiciaries as instruments to help make that protection effec-
tive in practice.
